Introduction
Leading food and agribusiness multinational enterprises (F&A MNEs), such as Unilever, Mars, Ferrero, Hershey, Nestlé, Cargill, Mondelez and Barry Callebaut, have committed themselves to enhancing their sourcing from small-scale farmers in a way that improves these farmers' livelihood/economic welfare. However, there are several barriers that need to be overcome to achieve this objective, because of the transactional and product-quality constraints of small-scale farmers in developing and emerging economies (London and Hart 2010; Wiggins et al., 2010; Torero 2011; Kabasa et al., 2015) . Examples are: dispersed production, low productivity, variable quality, high transaction costs, poor market institutions and an inaccessible rural financial system. Smallholder farming must be upgraded in order to achieve its full potential in accessing high value-adding supply chains effectively (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000 and Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2011) . Furthermore, F&A MNEs traditionally mainly source commodities from selected large traders and exporters (intermediaries), rather than directly from farmers, because transaction costs are too high.
Regarding corporate social responsibility, F&A MNEs applied private (voluntary) food standards, ethical codes, and certification schemes as sourcing modes (e.g. Henson and Humphrey, 2009; Geibler, 2013) . These conventional sourcing strategies aimed principally at complying with consumer concerns regarding food safety and environmental issues (e.g. Manning et al 2009; Trienekens et al., 2012) , rather than on improving farmers' livelihood.
This raises the question how F&A MNEs can best include smallholders in their sourcing strategies in order to take social responsibility for a sustainable and more equitable supply from a business perspective. A sustainable smallholder sourcing model was developed with a list of critical success factors (CSFs) form the literature (Sjauw- Koen-Fa et al., 2016) . In this model the business and corporate social responsibility perspectives are combined. This approach has not been studied extensively (cf. Perez-Aleman and Sandilands, 2008; Alvarez et al., 2010; Vorley and Thorpe, 2014) . It also differs from the concept of contract farming, which is defined as an contractual agreement between a focal firm and producers' organization or trader to obtain a supply of raw material product for processing or marketing (e.g. Gulati et al., 2008; Mwambi et al., 2014; Key and Rusten, 1999) .
The newly developed sustainable smallholder sourcing model with the list of CSFs differs from conventional ones in that it engages farmers in a long term cooperative relationship with the focal firm. In addition, this model not only comprises environmental sustainability performance, but also aims to improve farmers' livelihood from a business perspective.
In this sourcing model the business perspective (to secure sustainable supply) and corporate social responsibility perspective (to improve smallholders' livelihoods) are integrated. This model aimed at filling the need in sustainable Supply Chain Management literature to study supply chains that comply with the triple bottom line concept (economic, social and environment sustainability) (Elkington (1998) , rather than supply chains that are just more 'green' (Pagell and Shevechenco, 2014; Kleindorfer et al., 2005) . It also contributes to the need to conceptually and empirically link the bottom-of-the-pyramid (BOP)/Development approaches -referring to smallholder business model-with the supply chain management to address the social dimension of sustainability management , Lüdecke-Freund et al., 2016) .
The key objective of the present study is to explore the applicability of the newly developed sourcing model with the list of CSFs in two smallholder supply chains of one F&A MNE, namely the black soybean supply chain in Indonesia and the tomato supply chain in India.
Both supply chains have been considered best-practice examples for the exploration of the applicability of the model, including an assessment of the proposed critical success factors (CSFs) . Primary data of the value chain analysis of the two supply chains were used to determine similarities and differences, using the framework of the newly developed sustainable smallholder sourcing model with the CSFs as template. The aim is to determine similarities and differences between the cases. This paper proceeds as follows. In the Materials and Methods (Section 2) the developed sustainable smallholder sourcing model and the CSFs is introduced, followed by applied data sources and materials. Section 3 presents the findings of cross case analysis of the two supply chains, and Section 4 is Discussion and Conclusions.
Materials and Methods

Introduction to the sustainable smallholder sourcing model
The conceptual elements of smallholder sourcing strategies
The literature review was focused on articles that provide insights into smallholder inclusion in high value adding supply chains from two contrasting perspectives: top-down (from the buyer-focal firm perspective); and bottom-up (from the seller-smallholder perspective). Key articles/sourcing elements were found in the categories of global value chains, supply chain management, international business management, development, and Business & Society/CSR research strands. In empirical literature for best practice case studies on smallholder inclusion in high value adding supply chains by F&A MNEs were explored to learn about smallholder sourcing approaches, barriers and drivers, and corporate responsiveness to social issues. For the purpose of the present study best-practice cases is defined as ones that have proven to work well over a period of time and produce good results for buyers as well as sellers. The focus was on scaled sustainable smallholder supply chains that could provide enough data, rather than on pilot projects.
In the literature on global value chains two key conceptual elements of sourcing strategies for smallholder inclusion have determined. The first one is 'upgrading', which is a key concept for the bottom-up global value chain approach. Gereffi et al., (2005, p. 13) defined economic upgrading as 'a move of firms to higher value-added activities or interventions in production to improve technology, knowledge and skills, and to increase the benefits or profits deriving from participation in regional or global production networks. 'Upgrading' interventions focus on strategies to effectively bridge the gap between capabilities required for the domestic market and those required for assessing export markets (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000; Kaplinsky, 2001 ). However, there are different types and applications of the concept of upgrading for value chains: process, product, functional, and inter-sectoral upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002) .
The second conceptual element of sourcing strategies for smallholder inclusion is 'governance', which is a top-down global value chain approach. This concept focuses mainly on lead firms and the organization of international industries. Global value chain approaches look at inter-firm collaboration within the supply chain as well as cooperation with nontraditional chain members such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (Webb et al., 2010; Hahn and Gold, 2013; Rivera Santos et al., 2010) as a competitive advantage . Gereffi et. al., (2005) distinguished five types of governance forms in global value chains and they also postulated a framework of three independent variables to determine (to choose) the governance structure in global value chains: 1) the complexity of information and knowledge required to sustain a particular transaction, 2) the extent to which this information and 3) the knowledge can be applied and the capabilities of the supply base (Gereffi et al., 2005) . We applied the characteristics of smallholder supply as defined by Riijsgaard et al., (2010) to assess which type of Gereffi et al., (2005) governance structure can best coordinate smallholder supply chains lead by F&A MNEs. Humphrey (2004) reported on studies that highlight the role of captive relationships in product and process upgrading for development.
The difference between captive and hierarchical (vertical integrations) type of governance of global value chains regarding the 'lock-in' approach of suppliers is that in vertical integrations that the lead firm keeps full control of the entire chain for achieving short term gains, such as lowering transaction costs. In captive governance type the lead firm cooperates with the suppliers aimed at upgrading suppliers' capabilities and achieving synergy, i.e. the focus is on long term gains.
A third conceptual element for smallholder sourcing strategy found was from supply chain management literature. Hahn and colleagues ( (1990) introduced the concept of supplier development programs, which would help in upgrading suppliers in developing economies to produce goods -such as apparel and automobile and electronic parts -for MNEs situated in developed countries. They defined this concept as a long-term cooperative effort between a buying firm and its suppliers to upgrade the latter's technical, quality, delivery, and cost capabilities. The ultimate goal of supplier development programs is to form a mutually beneficial relationship that will help the partners ('buyer and seller') of the supply chain to compete in the market place (Watts et al., 1992; Krause and Ellram, 1997) . The lead firm (F&A MNE) keeps control and monitoring over the entire smallholder supply chain, but the focus is on long term business perspectives and mutual benefits, rather than achieving quick wins.
The three concepts have been adjusted for smallholder inclusion in high value-adding supply chains and combined them into strategic sourcing concepts as the Sustainable Smallholder Sourcing model (3S-model).
The critical success factors of smallholder inclusion in high value-adding supply chains
Critical success factors (CSFs) for smallholder inclusion in high value-adding supply chains is defined as the limited number of areas of activities where 'things must go right' to allow this inclusion to flourish (adapted from Rockart, 1979) . These are areas/activities in which good performance is necessary to ensure that smallholder inclusion through the supplier development program will become a viable and sustainable business case.
To explore CSFs of smallholder inclusion in the literature, we transformed the main sourcing question ('How F&A MNEs can best include smallholders in their sourcing strategies in order to take social responsibility for a sustainable and more equitable supply from a business perspective') into six critical sub-questions. For the transformation of the main research question we explored Supply Chain Management (SCM) literature on the domains of sourcing/strategic purchasing and buyer-supplier relationships, and the literature on Subsistence Market and Bottom of the Pyramid (BOP) on the domains of competitive and institutional environment, networks, and farmer business models. The aim was to identify leverage points/synergistic connections between MNE (the buyer), sourcing strategies (topdown approach of the supply chain), and small-scale farmer business models (bottom-up approach of the supply chain). Enabling to define the six sub-questions based on the synergistic connections that were found.
Key literature that provided a complete overview of the challenges and dimensions of SCM and the BOP that were explored to determine leverage points/synergistic linking smallholder inclusion in high value-adding supply chains with a business perspectives: -The Supply Chain Management domains: The research framework of classical SCM of Chen and Paulraj (2004) , the Sustainable SCM dimensions of Carter and Rogers (2008) and the elements of the supply-based continuity of Pagell et al., (2010) .
-The BOP domains: The 'BOP producers constraints frameworks' of London et al., (2010) , the 'TOP vs. BOP networks and implications for MNEs' of Rivera-Santos and Rufin (2010).
The aim was to identify leverage points/synergistic connections between MNEs sourcing strategies and small-scale farmer business models. The determined critical sub-questions on the main research question (see above) and the related CSFs including the key literature on them, were:
1. Sub question 1: What are the key characteristics of smallholders in developing regions that are suitable for inclusion from a viable business perspective? CSF (1): Smallholders that can be included are commercially oriented and are willing and able to adapt to upgrading interventions (Christen and Anderson, 2013; Torero, 2011 ).
2. Sub-question 2: How can smallholder productivity, product quality, and delivery be reliably improved to meet the demands of high value-adding supply chains in a sustainable and competitive way? CSF (2): Building partnerships for upgrading, i.e. entering into inter-organizational relationships and the capabilities needed to upgrade smallholders (e.g. Monczka et al., 1998; Gold et al., 2013) .
3. Sub-question 3: Which governance structures offer the best upgrading prospects for smallholder inclusion in high value chains? CSF (3): Building a captive governance structure based on a cooperative 'buyer-seller' relationship (Gereffi et al., 2005; Landros and Monczka, 1989; Mohr and Spekman, 1994) .
4. Sub-question 4: How can vertical coordination in smallholder supply chains be strengthened to effectively and efficiently upgrade interventions? CSF (4): Building effective producer organizations to overcome barriers of dispersed production and high transaction costs (Onumah et al., 2007; Chambo, 2009; Getnet and Anullo, 2012; Poole and Donovan, 2014) .
5. Sub-question 5: How can accessible and affordable rural financial systems be created to effectively ease smallholder demand for investment, working capital, and savings? CSF (5): Building an accessible and affordable rural financing system (Chalmers et al., 2006; Miller and Jones, 2010; Sjauw-Koen-Fa, 2012 ).
6 Sub-question 6: What are the commitments, attributes, and procurements that organizations need to invest in so as to generate effective smallholder supplier development programs? CSF (6): Presence of a proactive CSR strategy supported by a committed topmanagement (Trent and Monczka, 2002; Mohamad et al., 2009; Tilburg van et al., 2012; Gold et al., 2013) .
CSF (7): Use of Cross-functional teams within F&A MNEs to harmonize organizational values, routines and resources, and to interact effectively with supply chain counterparts (Trent and Monczka, 1994; Driedonks et al., 2013; Olsen and Boxenbaum, 2009 ). 
Designing a framework for sustainable smallholder sourcing
Data sources and Materials
Case selection
The cases selected to explore the applicability of the sustainable smallholder sourcing model were Unilever's black soybean supply chain in Java/Indonesia and its tomato supply chain in Maharashtra/India.
The black soybean supply chain was initiated by Unilever Indonesia in partnership with cooperatives of small-scale paddy farmers and the supplier of improved black soybean seeds in 2002/2003. The aim was to secure sustainable supply which is a key ingredient of the authentic black soybean sweet soy sauce brand of Unilever. Locally produced black soybeans, which were traditionally supplied by regional commodity traders, were limited. The aim was to help small-scale paddy farmers in Java to produce black soybeans. The research was focused on the scale-up phase between 2008-2013.
The tomato supply chain was initiated in 2011 in partnership with a local food processor. The aim was to produce tomatoes by local small-scale farmers in compliance with Unilever's sustainability codes set by a local food processor (Processor) in Maharashtra. These tomatoes were processed into paste for Unilever India, and used as key ingredient of their branded tomato ketchup. Until then, Unilever India was largely dependent on imports of paste from China, which has higher transaction costs and sustainability certification costs.
These two cases were selected because they were scaled up, and provided longitudinal data and opportunities to review the evolution of the supplier development program (Hahn et al., 1990 and Watts et al., 1992) , the upgrading program (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002 ) and the governance structure (Gereffi et al., 2005 ) over a period of time. They were part of a joint research program run by Unilever) in partnership with an NGO (Oxfam) in the period 2010-2015 (see Tait, 2015) . For the research design they applied similar methods consisted of value chain analysis, data collection method and practical toolkits. 
Data sources of the cases
Primary data for both cases was done by field research during November-December 2013 (see using the framework of the 3S-model with the CFSs as template, and similarities and differences between the two supply chains were outlined.
Results
Design of the black soybean supply chain map and the farmers' business model
Figure 2 demonstrates an overview of the drafted black soybean smallholder supply chains from Unilever Indonesia in Java, based on the multi-stakeholder workshop and information given by the interviewees. There are two black soybean supply chains. One is Unilever Indonesia's own developed supply chain, which runs 'Smallholders (members) -Cooperatives -Unilever Indonesia Procurement'. The other is the traditional supply chain consisting of selected regional commodity traders running 'Smallholders (from other areas than from the Cooperatives) -Commodity traders -Unilever Indonesia Procurement'. However, both supply chains were interrelated through the application of similar price, product quality, and delivery conditions set by Unilever Indonesia. For the purposes of this paper, only results of the 'own' black soybean supply chain developed by Unilever Indonesia are presented. The developed black soybean supply chain (right side of figure 2) consists of two activities. The first is the buying processes (the axis Unilever Indonesia -CooperativesSmallholders) led by Unilever Procurement and the second is the upgrading processes (the axis Unilever Indonesia-Cooperatives and the Seed supplier) led by Unilever CSR. In this case the mission of Unilever CSR is to support corporate sustainable business development in Indonesia (Urip, 2010, p. 99-122) . A partnership consisting of the Unilever Indonesia Unilever Indonesia to cooperatives and from cooperatives to smallholders groups. Informal and spontaneous communication seemed to be less fluid.
In this map the appliance of the concepts of upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002) , the supplier development program (Hahn et al., 1990; Watts et al., 1992) and the captive governance structure based on a long term cooperative relationship with partners by Unilever Indonesia (Gereffi et al., 2005) of the 3S-model have been found.
The sourcing process of black soybeans to produce sweet soy sauce started with Procurement calculating the required amount of soybeans for the next season to produce sweet soy sauce, including a prefixed farm gate price and product quality before planting and buying conditions. The price was set above the average domestic price and F&A MNE has committed itself to buy all produced soybeans. With this information Unilever CSR consulted the cooperatives and the partnership seed-supplier to explore how many of the black soybeans could be produced by the small-scale paddy farmer/smallholders. The outcomes of the negotiations on buying conditions were written down in a memorandum of understanding cosigned by Unilever Indonesia, the Cooperatives, and the Seed supplier. As this supply chain could not deliver all the beans Unilever Indonesia required, the remaining soybeans needed for the next season were contracted from selected regional commodity traders operating in other areas than those of the Cooperatives.
It was found that the government was arm length involved in the partnership for upgrading of the smallholders. The explanation is that the Indonesian government was implementing liberal import policies regarding domestic soybean supply, favoring the import of cheaper (yellow) soybeans (Daranto and Usman, 2011). The aim was to provide cheap food proteins based on soybeans (e.g. tahu, tempe and taucho) to low-income households.
Critical performance indicators of the black soybean supply chain in the period [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] provided by Unilever Foundation show progressive results. The number of farmers participating in the black soybean program increased in the period from 5,000 to 8,300. The total planted area and the average yield rose from 1,033 to 2,560 hectare and 360 to 700 kg per hectare, respectively. The part of the own supply chain in the total demand of black soybeans of Unilever Indonesia increased from 20 to 60 percent in the same period.
The result of the farmer workshop is the famers' business model (see Figure 3) . The starting point for reading Figure 4 is the building block 'Partners' (Unilever Indonesia/Intermediaries/ input suppliers) where an upgrading program is offered to farmers for growing black soybeans/tomatoes under certain buying and price conditions. The Customers for the products are the intermediaries (cooperatives/processor/local traders), Unilever Indonesia sources from these intermediaries. However, famers can chose to grow different crops (Key activities) which require different inputs (Key resources) and costs of production per unit (Cost structure). The Value proposition of growing black soybeans/tomatoes is that they must comply with Unilever Indonesia's requirements.
Farmers must therefore enter into a contractual relationship (Customer relationship) with the intermediaries. Farmers sell their harvests to different customers (Channels) and get payment for their deliveries which is the farm gate price per unit (Revenue structure). To turn a profit, the total revenues per unit (R) must exceed the total costs of production per unit (C) at an expected yield per hectare. Therefore, the indicator Revenue/Cost (R/C)-ratio is used. A ratio higher than 1 indicates the farmer is turning a profit, while a ratio lower than 1 indicates a loss. The pre-calculated R/C-ratio was 1.8 (2013). The costs price of black soybean production was calculated by the University of Gaja Mada. The key parameters of the cost price were: costs (labor, inputs, land rent, tax, and spraying); yield and revenues per unit (farm gate price). A positive result (R/C -ratio larger than one) of growing black soybeans was also confirmed by cross-checking during the semi-structured interviews with farmers and in the farmer workshop. This indicated that planting black soybean was profitable for farmers.
The score cart of the New Business Model Principles to examine the inclusiveness of the black soybean supply program showed also positive results.
It was also found that smallholders are free to join the supply program. They could choose to grow another crop, like corn, pepper and groundnut for the local market, which could be more attractive from the business perspective of the smallholder. Existence of some degree of free ridding of smallholders without penalties occurred, when price offered by traders were higher. Domestic soybean price depends on the import price, which is over the year relatively stable.
In the period 2011-2014 the domestic price was on average 5 % above the import price. The prefixed contract farm gate price of black soybeans was related to the domestic price, and was set 5 to 10% higher. The overall conclusion is that the black soybean case can generally be conceptualized within the framework of the sustainable smallholder supply model, although a direct role of the government in the partnership for upgrading was not confirmed.
Critical Success Factors of the black soybean case
The CSFs related to the model that were found in the black soybean supply chain in Java were:
CSF 1: The selected farmers cultivating black soybean are commercially/market oriented small-scale paddy farmers (0.3 hectares on average). CSF 2: A partnership was formed and a supplier development program was set up for upgrading small-scale paddy farmers. Unilever Indonesia Procurement led the buying processes while CSR led the upgrading processes, because upgrading local small-scale paddy farmers is consistent with the mission of the Unilever CSR policy.
CSF 3: The governance structure of the black soybean supply chain is of a captive type led by Unilever Indonesia and is based on a cooperative 'buyer-seller' relationship for black soybean supplier development.
CSF 4: Cooperatives were empowered by Unilever Indonesia in order to strengthen the vertical coordination of the black soybean supply chain. Farmers were clustered into groups in order to communicate effectively and lower the transactional costs.
CSF 5: The guaranteed price for black soybean of a certain quality, the prepay system before harvest, and a buying commitment provided by Unilever Indonesia eased the credit demand of, and lowered the risks for, the black soybean farmers.
CSF 6: Presence of a proactive CSR strategy for developing a smallholder supply chain to secure a sustainable supply of black soybeans, supported by a commitment of the management at head-quarter as well as subsidiary level of Unilever.
CSF 7: Use of cross-functional teams of Unilever Indonesia Procurement and CSR with a clear division of tasks, resources, and incentives for effective black soybean supplier development, both focused on the same strategic sourcing goal.
The overall conclusion of the assessment regarding the critical success factors (CSFs) of the black soybean supply chain is that they are generally in line with the CSFs identified in the sustainable smallholder supply model. A clear difference we found was that Unilever Indonesia did not extend credit and loans to farmers, as they are not a credit institution. Figure 3 gives an overview of the drafted tomato supply chain map for producing tomato paste in the Indian state of Maharashtra. Unilever India is chain leader and buys the paste from a local qualified fruit and vegetable processor (Processor), for which smallholders produce the tomatoes that meets Unilever sustainable codes. Therefore, they participate on a contract base in a upgrading program from the Food Processor.
The tomato supply chain map
The different arrows in Figure 4 represent the flow of farm inputs and of upgrading support services and of outputs (products and payments) between chain actors. The circle represents the partnership for upgrading support services, consisting of Unilever India, Processor, and input suppliers. The sourcing process of the tomatoes consists of two activities: 1) the buying process of sustainable tomatoes to be processed into paste by Unilever India in the supply chain (the axis Unilever India-Processor (intermediary)-smallholders; and 2) the upgrading process to improve smallholder farming in the supply chain (the partnership of Unilever India-Processorinput suppliers). The participation of the input suppliers as well as the state government of Maharashtra in the upgrading process of smallholder farming were based on a strategic partnership with Unilever India (represented by the yellow ellipse). As such, Unilever India is qualified as leader of the entire tomato (paste) supply chain. The direct involvement of the State Government stems from the fact that the marketing system of fruits and vegetables, tomatoes included, in India has historically been strongly regulated by the government (e.g. Hegde et al., 2013) . Therefore, Indian marketing regulations prescribe primary producers (farmers) of fruit and vegetables to sell their harvest in 'mandis' (wholesale markets yards) which are governmentally regulated and monitored (e.g. Krishnamurthy and Witsoe, 2012) .
The drivers of the business case of the tomato supply chain in Maharashtra were the increasing domestic demand for ketchup and the wish to replace the more expensive imports of paste from China. The sourcing process of tomatoes starts with a guarantee by Unilever India to the Processor for minimum volume at a fixed price of the tomato paste supply. Based on this buying commitment, the Processor contracted smallholders for the cultivation of tomatoes that meet the high quality and sustainability standards of Unilever (Sustainable Agricultural Codes) at pre-fixed prices and with a short payment time. These also included a package consisting of training of smallholders, technical assistance, and input materials. The
Processor committed itself to buy up to 100% of the produce, but smallholders were allowed to sell a maximum of 25% of their produce on the open market, in case the market price was higher. Smallholders are free to participate in the supply program. They planted on average 50% of their of their land with tomatoes, the other half of the land they grow vegetables, fruit and livestock. Tomato market price is highly volatile because production depends highly on weather condition (production shocks) and lack of warehousing (perishables).
Smallholder were organized in groups with a lead farmer as a single point of contact for keeping transactional costs low. Information flows freely through the chain in a variety of ways: training and information services provided by input suppliers and the Processor to smallholders groups, with visits once a week and by mobile phone. There was even interactions between Unilever India and smallholders through meetings and farm visits.
In this supply chain map the appliance of the concepts of upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002) , the supplier development program (Hahn et al., 1990; Watts et al., 1992 ) and the captive governance structure based on a cooperative relationship with chain partners by Unilever Indonesia (Gereffi et al., 2005) The found Revenue/Costs -ratio of tomato production, which was positive (much larger than one). This information was based on data and information emerging in the interviews, and multi-stakeholder and farmers workshops.
This indicated that planting tomatoes was profitable for farmers. The score cart of the New Business Model Principles to examine the inclusiveness of the tomatoes supply program showed also positive results.
Critical Success Factors of the tomato case
The following critical success factors were found in the tomato case:
CSFs 1: Tomato producers were commercially oriented smallholders (1.31 hectare on average).
CSF 2: A partnership was set up to upgrade smallholder tomato farming, led by Unilever India and Processor, with input from suppliers and the state government.
CSF 3: The governance structure of the supply chain was a captive type, led by Unilever India and based on a cooperative relationship.
CSF 4: The existence of producers organization/cooperative was not detected, because the Processor (intermediary) in the tomato case is a private company.
CSF 5: Unilever India provided buying commitment, price guarantees, and short terms of payment to ease farmers' demand for credit and to lower their risks.
CSF 6: A clear sustainable smallholder strategy by Unilever India was present.
CSF 7: Use of cross-functional teams by Unilever India was not found. The upgrading process was outsourced to Processor who cooperated with the input suppliers. Unilever India-CSR (companies foundation) was not involved in the upgrading process.
The overall conclusion is that most of the critical success factors found in the tomato case are in line with the CSFs related to the sourcing model. Differences were found regarding CSFs 4, 5 and 7.
Findings from the cross case analysis of the black soybean and tomato supply chain
Conceptualization of the two supply chains within the 3S-model
In both supply chains the concepts of 1) upgrading to improve smallholder production (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002) ; 2) the supplier development program in which 'buyer and seller' enter into a cooperative long term partnership for upgrading (Hahn et al. 1990 and Watts et al. 1992) , and 3) the captive governance structure in which the focal firm coordinates the entire smallholder supply chains (Gereffi et al., 2005) have been found.
The cross case analysis is concerned with determination of building blocks of the two supply chains using the frame work of the 3S-model as template (Table 1) . A local food processor (a private company) delivered tomato paste to Unilever India on supply contract basis. Processor organized smallholders to produce tomatoes on a contract farming base, and led the upgrading processes with support from input suppliers. Smallholders were grouped into 15-20 farmers. Smallholders Commercial/market-oriented smallscale paddy farmers
Commercial/market-oriented smallholders.
Partnership model
Partners: Unilever Indonesia, cooperatives, and the seed supplier (a university).
Government is involved at arm's length.
Partners: Unilever India, local food processor, Pesticide and plan protection, and fertilizer suppliers (all were multinational companies). To replace import of tomato paste with local produce and accelerating the improvement of smallholders' livelihoods.
All building blocks of the sustainable smallholder supply model were found in both supply chains, i.e. both cases can be conceptualized through the model. However, there were also differences between the two supply chain maps, namely:
1) the involvement in the upgrading process: in the black soybean case Unilever Indonesia was direct involvement in organizing of the upgrading program, while in the tomato case this was 'outsourced' to the Processor (supplier) ;
2) The pesticide and plant protection, and fertilizer suppliers were not involved in the black soybean case because smallholders purchased the inputs from local suppliers (SMEs) by themselves. Fertilizers and plant protection chemicals suppliers were in the tomato case involved in the Partnership, providing not only tailored (kits) fertilizers, fungicides and pesticides, but also expertise in the area of micronutrients and soil improvement to smallholders farmers through field-level technical staff. After all, the use of fertilizers and plant protection chemicals in the cultivation of tomatoes are more critical in terms of supply risks, food safety, environmental sustainability and costs of production than black soybean.
3) the involvement of the government in the upgrading program, in the black soybean case at arm's length, while in the tomato case they were direct involved; These differences provide important lessons for (re)designing sustainable smallholder sourcing strategies. For this, we need to take the context into consideration, such as geographical and political differences, and the sourcing strategies of F&A MNEs.
Considerations are:
Unilever had different positions in the upgrading activity in each smallholder supply chain, but it kept its role as chain leader in both cases, thus demonstrating to have a proactive CSR strategy (e.g. Tilburg et al., 2012; Trent and Monczka, 2002; Gold et al., 2013) . This is the key characteristic of the captive governance structure (Gereffi et al., 2005) and as such confirms CSF 3 in the sustainable smallholder sourcing model. There were similarities between both cases in attributes of the alliances found in the smallholder supply partnerships.
For instance, there was a deep understanding of, and commitment to the sustainable sourcing strategy, both at Unilever Indonesia and Unilever India. There were similar capabilities too, including access to local networks to facilitate upgrading and interventions in the long term.
In both cases alliances between participants of the supply program were based on commitment, trust, transparency, two way communication, and joint problem solving, i.e. all attributes of cooperative business relationship. The lesson learned from the two cases is that the attributes of alliances of intermediaries (suppliers) and commitment to sustainable and more equitable smallholder inclusion are more important than their business forms. However, the business form is important too, for instance a cooperative gives member farmers more influence on strategies and gives them a voice with which to create a power balance in the value chain. The role and involvement of the government in both supply chains was different.
This was geographically determined, and depending on the marketing system. It was regulated in the tomato case and under a liberal market policy in the black soybean case.
Nonetheless, government involvement in smallholder supplier development programs is a critical attribute because of its supportive character and its impact on local economic development (Helmsing, 2003) .
The differences found in regard to the business forms of intermediaries (cooperatives vs. private company), and input suppliers (public organization vs. multinationals) confirmed that the business form of the intermediary is not a critical attribute of upgrading programs.
Similarities and differences in critical success factors between the two case Comparing the CSFs of both cases resulted in similarities with regard to CSFs 1, 3 and 6, and differences with regard to CSFs 2, 4, 5 and 7. The differences were:
CSF 2: Partnerships can be built on an operational level for upgrading (in both cases) but also on a strategic level (in the tomato case).
CSF 4: This CSF was not found in the tomato case, because the Processor is a private company instead of a producer organization/cooperative. The assumption is that a cooperative
representing ( 
Discussion and Conclusions
As viewed from the MNEs, the food supply challenge is that the global economy is entering a new phase in which a growing concentration of Global Value Chains are driving transformations that are reshaping current governance structures (Gereffi, 2014) . In addition, The purpose of the present study is to explore the applicability of the developed model in two best-practice cases. The overall conclusion is that 1) both cases could be conceptualized through the 3S-model and 2) CSF 2 and 4 have been fine-tuned, CSF 5 has been modified and CSF 7 has been adjusted: 'Use of cross-functional teams within and outside the firm' (Chen and Paulraj, 2008) .
This research project setting in which a multinational and a NGO are involved for value chain analysis has impacted the inclusive interpretation of the research questions, the applied methodology, tools and the used indicators. As such, it strengthened linking of the bottom-up as well the top-down perspectives of the smallholder supply chains. Second, the selected cases cover two smallholder supply chains in different geographical areas under one MNE. The advantage of this approach was, that differences in corporate strategy, when comparing cases from different MNEs, could be mitigated in this case. Furthermore, the geographical impact, being the role of the government in the inclusion of smallholders in high value-adding supply chains, could be explored as a control variable of the 3S-model.
Based on the findings of this research, it was concluded that the 3S-model would be a suitable way to conceptualize the dynamics behind sustainable smallholder supply.
However, it raises questions about the limitations of the present study. First, despite a positive indication of the contribution to the smallholders' livelihoods, the question remains whether smallholders actually get an equitable piece of the pie. In other words, do they get a fair price for their produce that covers all costs and risks? For several reasons it is hard to give a clear answer to this question. For instance, the business development and learning characteristics of supplier development programs, and agronomical conditions and soil quality can vary greatly between regions and farms. Moreover, smallholders in developing economies are mostly unfamiliar with cost price calculations and bookkeeping and their lack of price and market information often puts them at the mercy of middlemen (e.g. London et al.,and Hart 2010) . Second, although this study illustrates that MNEs can involve smallholders in a sustainable and more equitable way in high value-adding supply chains from a business perspective. However, the overall effect of F&A MNEs in solving global food security and sustainable development challenges must not be overestimated. Among other things, they are constrained by their short-term commercial and business model orientation and their relatively small scale in the global food system compared to the magnitude of the economic development challenge of developing economies. They probably cannot do it alone World Economic Forum 2011) .
Third, a question that need a clear answer is how autonomy, democracy and mutual social and economic benefits are embedded in both cases, because the interaction between business partners are voluntary based?
Autonomy, democracy and mutual benefits of the supplier and customer interaction can be demonstrated as follows:
-. Both smallholder supply chains were no vertical integrations that are characterized by managerial control, flowing from managers to subordinates, or from headquarters to subsidiaries and affiliates. But, it were captive value chains based on a long term cooperative relationship aimed at upgrading of smallholders to supply high value-adding supply chains.
The supply chain maps (Figure 2 and 4) demonstrate the network structure and role of each chain partners.
-The contracting process for supply started with an proposal from the F&A MNE. Based this proposal Intermediaries consulted smallholders for supply. The result of this consultation round is that proposed farm gate price and buying commitments from the F&A MNEs could be adjusted. The aim is to attack as much as smallholder to meet the required demand of black soybean and tomatoes.
-. The critical performance indicators of both supply chain showed progressive results (see p.
15 and 21).
-In both cases smallholders were free to participate in the supply program. They could choose whether to plant black soybeans/tomatoes or another crop like corn, pepper or peanuts for the local markets. There was some degree of free ridding of black soybean smallholders without penalties when price offered by local traders are higher (we will add this point to the text (p. 20). In the tomato case, smallholders planted on average 50% of their of their land with tomatoes, the other half they grow vegetables, fruit and livestock. They were allowed to sell maximum 25% of the produced tomatoes to the Processor at a fixed prices regardless of the whole sale market prices (see p. 20).
Fourth, the findings of this study are based on just two cases. 
